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of the party with the burden of proof will help deter parties from litigating when their causes are utterly without foundation. Much needless
expense and time will thus be saved by both the judicial system and the
parties themselves.
FRED

H.

MOODY, JR.

The Impact of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
A substantial part if not most of the routine commercial transactions that occur in this country everyday are between persons having no
more than a minimal acquaintance with each other. To some degree this
is a product of urbanization and mobility of the population, and, to that
degree, dealing with strangers, or virtual strangers, should parallel the
trend of increasing urbanization. At the same time, there is a trend of
increasing credit transactions' and other transactions that have traditionally required at least one of the parties to have fairly extensive
knowledge about the other party. The resultant information gap has
been filled by various organizations, usually businesses known as credit
bureaus or credit reporting agencies, which undertake to provide the
information needed. Recently Congress determined that some regulation of these agencies is desirable and accordingly enacted the Fair
Credit Reporting Act 2 (FCRA). The objective of this comment is to
examine briefly the role played by credit reporting agencies, some of the
problems that result, how the problems have been dealt with traditionally, and how the FCRA copes with them.
THE NATURE OF-CREDIT REPORTING AND PROBLEMS IT CAUSES

The transactions in which credit reports are most frequently
used-the granting of credit, the underwriting of insurance, and employment-all involve some degree of risk, and the purpose of the report is
to assist in assessing it. Thus, the credit grantor is concerned with the
risk of whether the person to whom he grants credit will pay when the
obligation becomes due. The insurance underwriter is concerned about
identifying as precisely as possible the degree of risk against which he
'Hearings on H.R. 16340 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Conlin.
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 571 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
215 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681t (1970).
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is called upon to insure. The prospective employer is concerned with
whether the job applicant will be the sort of employee that he needs.
These risks may be dealt with in several ways. For example, the
credit grantor may be able to predict with fair accuracy that if he grants
credit to everyone who requests it, he will be unable to collect ten
percent of the money due him in any given year and will adjust the
interest rate charged so that the ninety percent who do pay will pay
enough for the lender to recover an amount equal to the total amount
lent plus a reasonable return thereon. Such a method effectively minimizes the risk to the credit grantor if the nonpayment prediction is
reasonably accurate, but in effect it transfers the burden of the nonpayment to the shoulders of the ninety percent who do pay. The values
of our society are such that this result is inequitable if there exists
another method of risk control that will more nearly result in each
individual paying his own way. The optimum pay-your-own-way
situation is for the credit grantor to lend only to those who are certain
to pay in full and on time. Since the requisite certainty is impossible,
most credit grantors use a combination of the two methods by which
borrowers are categorized according to the predicted likelihood of
timely repayment. Those categorized as unlikely to repay are not extended credit; those categorized as most likely to repay on time are
granted credit at an interest rate that represents the value of the use of
the money plus a small amount as a reserve against nonpayment by
some members of the category. The less likely the members of the
category are to repay, the larger will be the amount charged for nonpayment reserve. With this sort of system a critical determination is the
categorization of a given transaction. To some extent this is controlled
by the nature of the credit transaction itself-whether there is any collateral involved and what it is. The other major consideration is who the
borrower will be-will he pay or not? Any prediction of the likelihood
that any given person will pay must rest on some knowledge of that
person. At this point the credit report is typically used to verify and
supplement information that the credit applicant normally supplies
about himself. A credit report to a prospective credit grantor will typically contain information about the subject's monetary worth, his income, his history of making payments, suits filed against him, and other
miscellaneous information.
3

1Hearings on the Credit Industry Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
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The problem of the insurance underwriter and his approach to it
are very similar to those of the credit grantor. The risks involved are
somewhat different, but it is widely accepted that they can be reasonably
controlled if the underwriter has sufficient information about the person
or property to be insured. Thus the credit report on the applicant for
life or automobile insurance will contain information that hopefully will
illuminate his living and driving habits and the environment in which
he spends most of his time or where his car is usually kept.'
The problem of the prospective employer is apt to be less well
defined and his approach to it more subjective. His basic concern is with
the reliability and honesty of the applicant, a concern shared by the
credit grantor. Therefore, the nature of the report the employer seeks
is very similar to that used by the credit grantor, although perhaps it
contains more information about the applicant's living habits.
Until society's values change substantially enough that everyone
has a right to credit, insurance, or employment on a basis that causes
everyone to share the risks equally, it will be necessary for credit grantors, insurance underwriters, and employers to have information with
which to classify and control these inherent risks. While in most cases
the user of the credit report could himself gather most, if not all, of the
information in the credit report, it is quicker and cheaper to buy a report
from a credit reporting agency. Thus the role played by credit reporting
agencies in our economy is valuable if not absolutely necessary.'
Despite their value to the economy, the use of credit reports is not
without the potential for causing substantial harm. The user of a credit
report is harmed anytime he foregoes a profitable transaction because
of incorrect conclusions drawn from the report, but this type of injury
has not generated much interests because its relative magnitude is not
likely to be great, and it can be remedied for the most part in the market
place. The credit report user can go elsewhere for his information and
to some extent can pass on to his customers any losses occasioned by
the unsatisfactory reports. On the other hand, the plight of the subject
of the credit report has attracted substantial interest because he is more
likely to fit the traditional concept of a victim. 6
Three facets of credit reporting are potentially harmful to the subject of the report-the method used to gather the information, the dis'House Hearings478-85.
11d. at 571.

'See, e.g., House Hearings 42-43, 59-61, 433-43, 626-3 1, 631-38.
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semination of the information, and the accuracy of the information.
One source of information frequently used by credit reporting
agencies is public records. Typically the agency is interested in records
of lawsuits to which the subject is a party, recorded tax liens, bankruptcy or divorce proceedings, and criminal prosecutions. The primary
danger to the subject in such cases is that the information may be
inaccurate or incomplete. Thus in many jurisdictions the agency may
pick up and put in the subject's file the fact that he has been named the
defendant in a law suit but fail to disclose that the suit was settled or
dropped because the court keeps no up-to-date records of such dispositions. 7 Since public records frequently do not adequately identify the
individual, there may also be an increased risk of this sort of information getting into the file of the wrong subject if his name is a fairly
common one. There is also some danger that the person who searches
the public record and then makes an entry in the subject's file in the
process will write down incorrect or misleading information.'
A large part of the information in a credit report comes from those
who have previously granted credit to the subject. Businesses that regularly use credit reports normally agree to provide information about
their dealings with customers to the credit reporting agency. Such information is usually provided upon request from the agency, but in some
cases the business will report adverse information without request as a
matter of course. A reporting agency that is allied with a collection
agency may also have access to information about accounts placed for
collection Usually when the subject applies for credit, employment, or
insurance, he is required to give references, including the name of his
bank, which the credit report user passes along to the credit reporting
agency. Using that information, the agency then contacts the references
and seeks to learn from them the nature of the credit granted, the
highest amount granted, the promptness of payment, and the length of
time the reference has dealt with the subject.'" The transferring of information in this manner carries with it a certain potential for having
erroneous or incomplete information included in the subject's file. To
7See Hearingson Commercial Credit Bureaus Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Governmental Operations,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 125 (1968).
"See, e.g., House Hearings336-38.
'In the 130 largest cities in the United States, 66% of the credit reporting agencies affiliated
with the Associated Credit Bureaus of America are owned commonly with collection agencies.
Senate Hearings 42.
"See, e.g., the commonly used forms in Senate Hearings 143-245.
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begin with, the information can be no more accurate in the agency's file
than it was in the referrer's file, and the accuracy of record-keeping
systems of various referrers may vary widely. Because the information
is frequently transmitted by low-level clerical personnel over the telephone, the opportunity for transmission and identity errors may be
enhanced. Finally, there is also some danger that the referrer will deliberately give erroneous information because of some dispute with the
subject.
A third form of information-gathering that is widely used in preparing reports for prospective employers, insurance underwriters, and,
to a lesser extent, credit grantors is the interviewing of persons who
know or know about the subject. Current or previous employers of the
subject will be interviewed to determine the subject's work record, a key
inquiry frequently being whether the subject would be rehired by the
previous employer and in what position." Neighbors and fellow employees are frequently interviewed for the purpose of inquiring into the
personal habits and reputation of the subject with emphasis being placed
on the subject's drinking habits, his moral character, and the environment in which he lives. 2 Occasionally the subject himself or a member
of his household will be interviewed, 3 but for the most part this practice
seems to be confined to use by newcomer welcoming services that are
allied with a credit agency which uses the welcoming interview to start
a file on the subject. 4
Although the interviewing technique employed seems very similar
to that used by various governmental investigative agencies, there is
little evidence that credit reporting agencies use the techniques of surveillance and electronic surveillance that have brought criticism to the
government agencies. In fact, one of the criticisms most frequently
leveled against the interviewing technique of the credit reporting agencies is that it is too superficial, that it is prone to report the juicy bit of
gossip which does not accurately reflect the true character of the subject.'5 Despite the fact that the operating procedures of the larger companies that do most of the interviewing require the investigator to con"See id. at 167-71.
'2See, e.g., House Hearings474, 478-85.
'3See, e.g., Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
"Hearings on S. 823 Before the Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions of the Senate Comm,
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 168-72 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Financial
Hearings].
"Id.at 374.
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firm derogatory statements by those interviewed, 6 most investigators
are paid partly on a piecework basis or at least have quotas which place
a premium on rapid completion of a given job." The result is that such
reports are hurried compilations of hearsay from persons who may or
may not bear the subject malice. While the information gathered from
interviews is less likely than other information to suffer from mistakes
of identity, it is more likely to be inaccurate or incomplete and to reflect
the bias or malice of its source.
The interviewing method of information-gathering is the method
most likely to cause direct harm to the subject. Questions about the
subject necessarily imply some statement about the subject, and the
interviewer may feel compelled to give a little information to get some
information. In the process the subject's reputation may suffer. This
danger appears to be of a fairly small magnitude, however. The primary
danger of information-gathering appears to be that it may result in the
inclusion of inaccurate information in the subject's file.
Much of the information contained in a credit report is essentially
private in nature, the sort of information that will be unknown to the
subject's friends, acquaintances, and fellow employees or colleagues. It
may be the sort of information that the subject does not wish to be
generally known, because, for example, it would cause him humiliation
or embarrassment. This is particularly true since the subject's file will
be devoted primarily to assembling adverse information rather than
favorable information. 8 Thus, possibly only a single, insignificant
default in an extensive and otherwise unblemished credit life of a subject
may appear in his file. It is therefore of some importance to the subject
that such information be provided only to those who have a legitimate
need for it or his consent to seek it.
While the credit reporting industiy generally has recognized the
need or desirability of protecting the privacy of the subject, 9 the control
of dissemination of credit reports has been spotty in the past. There is
reason to believe that virtually anyone using a business name could
purchase a credit report on any individual in some localities.2 1Since the
"eHouse Hearings 474.
"Financial Hearings378-402.
"Although one company specializes in derogatory reports, most others do record favorable
information such as "pays on time" or "has good reputation"; however, apparently the major
effort is directed at adverse information. Id.
"E.g., Senate Hearings 69-72.
2
A good example of this was seen on CBS Evening News, March 17, 1969. The text of that
program segment is reprinted in House Hearings 59.
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typical credit reporting agency provides reports to its subscribers without question upon request, there is also a great opportunity for the
employees of the subscriber to obtain and use credit reports without
authorization. To make matters worse, until recently about the only
person who could not get a copy of the subject's credit report was the
subject himself. This was because the credit reporting agency's contract
with the user of the credit report prohibited disclosure of even the existence of the report to the subject."' The result of this practice was that
the subject might have application after application rejected without
reason and be unawareof the source and nature of the information
causing the rejections; he would realize something was wrong but be
unable to defend himself. Even where the subject might guess or be told
the source of the offending report, the credit agency would not normally
show him the report or discuss it with him. The most the subject might
get from the credit agency was advice to straighten out his dealings with
a particular merchant, or something of that nature.2
Another aspect of the dissemination problem has received publicity
recently-the use of electronic data processing equipment by credit reporting agencies.3 One of the largest agencies in the country currently
is a computerized operation,24 and it is likely that many, if not most, of
the larger agencies will eventually convert to computer operations. As
more and more of these agencies utilize computers, the ability to punch
a button or pick up a telephone and learn nearly everything about an
individual becomes more nearly a reality. This is a development that
many find disquieting. To some people the very existence of a computer
system capable of laying bare of the life of an individual is as distressful
25
as having a neighbor who stores explosives on the adjacent premises.
Regardless of the rationality of such a reaction, most people have had
enough contact with computerized business operations to be aware not
only that computer systems are capable of error but also that when
errors are made, they are devilishly hard to correct. Further, computers
possess no more judgment than they are programmed to exercise and
will usually provide information to anyone having physical access to the
machine who knows the appropriate code. The danger of unauthorized
2

Hearing on Retail Credit Co. Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1968).
2See, e.g., House Hearings 78-81.
2E.g., Miller, The Credit Networks: Detour to 1984, 210 THE NATION 648.
2'FinancialHearings373.

21Id. at 372-76.
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disclosure of information may thereby be increased.
The most obvious danger to the subject of the credit report, and
potentially the most harmful, is that the report may contain inaccurate
information. Inaccurate information includes not only incorrect information but also information that is misleading because of incompleteness or other factors. Most of the horror stories about credit reporting
and litigation involving it stem from some inaccuracy in a report. It
appears likely that the vast majority of credit reports are substantially
accurate,2 6 but, as has been seen, the methods used to collect and transmit file data virtually assure that mistakes will be made. Moreover, the
impact of a mistake upon the subject of the report can be of enormous
magnitude. It takes little imagination to foresee the possible consequences of an erroneous statement that the subject is a habitual drunkard and wife beater. Such a mistake could cause the subject to be all
but unemployable, uninsurable, and unable to obtain credit, and literally
might put him on the welfare rolls. Furthermore, under the previously
common practice of secrecy, he might never discover what had actually
happened and be totally unable to remedy his situation. In the past,
when the subject of the credit report has suffered harm as the result of
the actions of a credit reporting agency, his resort to the legal process
has'been of little value.
PRE-FCRA LEGAL REMEDIES
Methods generally used by credit reporting agencies to some extent
invade the privacy of the subject of the report; that is, they intrude upon
the subject's solitude or seclusion. Yet the courts seldom find the intrusion to be substantial enough to warrant judicial actionY Even a court
more inclined to protect the solitude of the subject may find that the
subject consented to the intrusion by applying for credit, insurance, or
employment 2 or that the conditional privilege afforded the credit reporting agency in defamation actions also applies to gathering the information. 29 It is generally recognized that a cause of action- may exist for
the public disclosure of private facts. 0 In the context of the credit
report, such an action is of little use because the courts have limited it

"House Hearings 130.
2E.g., Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
28See Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967).
"See Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 809 (4th ed. 1971).
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to situations in which the disclosure is to the public 3 (a large group),
the facts are private, 32 and the publication would be offensive to one
of ordinary sensibilities. 3 Very few credit reports are distributed
widely enough to make use of such a cause of action; secrecy rather than
publicity has been the traditional hallmark of credit reporting agencies.34
For the most part the only real hope that an injured credit report
subject has had for a judicial remedy has been the defamation action. 5
However, even where the subject of the credit report has been able to
establish the defamatory nature of the statement about himself and has
been able, if necessary, to show special damages, he has typically run
into an insurmountable obstacle-the conditional privilege generally
afforded credit reporting agencies.3 ' The law of defamation generally
treats as conditionally privileged statements made about third persons
to one whose interests may be affected by the third person 3 particularly where the person spoken to has requested the information. 8 The
privilege that protects the credit report is merely a facet of this broader
privilege, even though it is often stated in terms of a conditional privilege to make credit reports.3 9 Underlying the privilege as applied to
credit reports are several basic propositions that frequently go unarticulated. First, no one has a right to credit or, perhaps more precisely, no
one has a duty to risk his property on the conduct of others. Conversely,
the property owner has the right to pick and choose his risks, and, since
the degree to which he can cover his risks by charging higher rates may
"'Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89 (D.S.C. 1966).
3"Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
""See Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 331 (D.S.C.1967).
"'House Hearings475.
"'FinancialHearings438.
"See Note, The Mercantile Agency and Conditional Privilege in Defamation, II S.C.L.Q.
256 (1959). Two American jurisdictions, Georgia and Idaho, do not extend the privilege to credit
reporting agencies. The Georgia court felt that the furnishing of a credit report for consideration
was not the performance of a public or private duty, either legal or moral, that would invoke the
privilege provided by the Georgia Code. Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172 (1886). The Idaho
court refused to extend the privilege to credit reporting agencies on the theory that "[ihe company
that goes into the business of selling news reports about others should assume the responsibility
for its acts and must be sure that it is peddling the truth." Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co.,
25 Idaho 696, 704, 139 P. 1007, 1010 (1914).
"W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 115, at 787-89 (4th ed. 1971).
"'50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 202 (1970).
"'Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 821 (1952).
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be limited by the government, 0 he has a legitimate interest in information that will help him evaluate the risks involved. Secondly, it is socially
desirable that these inherently risky transactions occur.4' Inasmuch as
credit reports tend to encourage such transactions, credit reporting
agencies perform a service of great social value that tends to outweigh
the occasionally harmful effects they may have on the subjects of the
reports.12 Third is the strong feeling that the subject has at least impliedly consented to the use of such reports by applying for credit,
insurance, or employment and has thereby agreed to assume the risk of
ifiaccurate reporting that falls short of some gross misconduct by the
reporting agency. 3 The practical result is that the credit reporting
agency is granted immunity so long as its activities are directed toward
the protected purpose and the interests of the subjects are not too blatantly ignored.
As with other conditional privileges, the credit reporting agency
may lose its immunity if it abuses the privilege. The privilege may be
abused and lost by making the defamatory statements to those who do
not reasonably appear to have a legitimate interest in the information,44
or if the defamatory statement is not the sort of information in which
the user has a legitimate interest,4 5 or if the statement is made with
malice. " The policy that favors credit reporting seems to be strong
enough that the courts are reluctant to find abuses of the conditional
privilege. Thus a credit reporting agency may reasonably rely on nearly
any representation of interest of a potential user without losing the
privilege47 and may likewise furnish any information that is arguably
"0E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 24-1 to -17 (Supp. 1971) (interest rate controls); id. § 58-131.2
(1965) (insurance commissioner empowered to change certain insurance rates); id. §§ 95-85 to 96 (minimum wage act).
"It hardly bears repeating that America has a credit-based economy. At the end of 1968, there
were nearly 350 billion dollars of consumer credit outstanding in the United States. Financial
Hearings 319.
"Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 821 (1952).
13See Harrison v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 264 F. Supp. 89, 92 (D.S.C. 1967).
"Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency Inc., 194 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 821 (1952).
"Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 S.C. 287, 297, 67 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1951); Lathrop
v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 144, 148, 104 P. 176, 178 (1909).
"Hooper-Holmes Bureau, Inc. v. Bunn, 161 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1947).
"See Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160, 162-62 & n.4 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 821 (1952).
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relevant to the proposed transaction without losing the privilege." The
policy of protecting credit reports is strong only when the reporting
agency is trying in good faith to provide accurate information to the
user; there is no interest in protecting those motivated by malice. Courts
have tended to disagree about what conduct constitutes malice sufficient
to lose the privilege. Most agree that it is not limited to ill-will or malice
in a moral sense, but also includes conduct consciously indifferent to or
in reckless disregard of the rights of others." Beyond that point agreement disappears, and various courts have found the privilege vitiated
where there were no reasonable grounds for believing a statement to be
true,5' where there was negligence so gross as to amount to malice,"2 and
where there was negligence in preparing or communicating the report.5 3
However, the vast majority of courts reject negligence as sufficient to
destroy the conditional privilege.54 To the extent that the subject has any
chance of penetrating the privilege, it seems that trying to show a reckless indifference to his interests offers the greatest hope of success;
actually proving it would be difficult.
For the most part, unless the subject of the credit report is able to
show fairly gross misconduct by the credit reporting agency, he is left
without a remedy and must console himself with the knowledge that his
suffering promotes the smooth flow of commerce for everyone's benefit.

PosT-FCRA

REMEDIES

Congress determined, after lengthy hearings, that the interests of
the subjects of credit reports were not being adequately protected and
set out to remedy the situation itself. That effort culminated in the Fair
Credit Reporting Act,5 5 which was enacted as an amendment to the
Consumer Credit Protection Act.5 The FCRA was designed to give
"See, e.g., Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 201 A.2d 344 (1963). There the
plaintiff had applied for life insurance and the credit report indicated that neighbors suspected that

the plaintiff was a lesbian. Without discussing the relevance of lesbianism to life insurance the court
found that no abuse of the conditional privilege had been shown.
"15 Am.JuR. 2D Collection and Credit Agencies § 23 (1964).
10Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1049, § 3[a] (1971).
"Roemer v. Retail Credit Co., 3 Cal. App. 3d 368, 371, 83 Cal. Rptr. 540, 542 (Ct. App.
1970).
"Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 390, 90 S.E.2d 370, 373 (1955).
"Douglass v. Daisley, 114 F. 628, 634 (1st Cir. 1902).
-"Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1049, § 3[b] (1971).
015 U.S.C. §§ 1681 to 1681t (1970).
mId. §§ 1601 to 1681t.
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increased protection to consumers; 7 the Congress apparently felt that
businessmen were capable of taking care of themselves in these matters.
Its general scheme is to establish certain standards of conduct for both
credit reporting agencies and users of credit reports; to provide some
practical, non-judicial remedies for consumers; to provide for civil judicial remedies for the consumer; and to provide for administrative and
58
criminal enforcement of some standards.
The FCRA seeks substantially to eliminate the problems caused by
the practices of credit reporting agencies, 59 imposing upon them various
duties and standards of conduct. The circumstances under which a credit
report"0 may be issued are restricted to those enumerated in the statute.
Issuance of a report is permissible only (1) in response to a court order;
(2) in accordance with the written instructions of the subject; (3) to a
person who the agency has reason to believe intends to use the information (a) in connection with a credit transaction involving the extension
of credit to, or review or collection of an account of, the subject, (b) for
employment purposes, (c) in connection with underwriting insurance
involving the subject, or (d) in connection with certain governmental
transactions; or (4) to a person the agency has reason to believe "otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information in connection
with a business transaction involving" the subject." In addition, credit
agencies are permitted to furnish identifying information about the subject to governmental agencies, but not a full report unless the govern2
ment's need to know falls within one of the other permitted categories.
Recognizing that much of the information typically contained in
credit reports tends to lose its descriptive value with the passage of time,
the FCRA requires that obsolete information be deleted from reports
"The FCRA defines a consumer as an individual. Id. § 1681a(c). The definition of "consumer

report" speaks of credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, which fairly indicates a desire to exclude business transactions. Id. § 1681a(d).

"The provisions for administrative and criminal enforcement are in id. §§ 1681q-81s; they will
not be treated here. For a critical view of the effectiveness of the administrative provisions, see
Note, The FairCredit Reporting Act, 23 MAINE L. REv. 253, 261-63 (1971).
"The FCRA uses the name "consumer reporting agency," which is broadly defined as "any
person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in

whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and

which uses any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing
consumer reports." 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (1970).
e'The FCRA uses the name "consumer report." Id. § 168la(d).
611d. § 1681b.
121d. § 1681f.
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unless the report is used in connection with a credit or insurance transaction of 50,000 dollars or more or in connection with employment of an
individual at an annual salary of 20,000 dollars or more. 3 Information
is obsolete if it pertains to a bankruptcy more than fourteen years old
or if it is adverse information more than seven years old. 4 The exception
for large transactions merely recognizes that the risk-taker has a legitimate interest in more detailed information where the amount risked is
large.
The poor reliability of adverse character information obtained by
interviewing neighbors or others who know or know of the subject is
particularly recognized by a provision that requires such information
contained in a report to be verified before it is used in a subsequent
report if the information is more than three months old.65 Reporting
agencies are also required to maintain procedures to assure that public
record information contained in reports for employment purposes is up
to date and complete as of the date of the report or to notify the subject
that public record information is being reported to the person requesting
the report. This is one of the weakest provisions of the FCRA, and why
it was limited to reports for employment purposes is not apparent.
Possibly Congress felt that consumers could adequately protect themselves by seeing to it that public records were accurate and complete.
The strongest provision in terms of imposing an unequivocal duty
upon reporting agencies is section 607.7 It provides:
(a) Every consumer reporting agency shall maintain reasonable
procedures designed to avoid violations of section 605 [15
U.S.C. § 1681c] [obsolete information] and to limit the furnishing of
consumer reports to the purposes listed under section 604 [15
U.S.C. § 1681b]. These procedures shall require that prospective
users of the information identify themselves, certify the purposes for
which the information is sought, and certify that the information will
be used for no other purpose. Every consumer reporting agency shall
make a reasonable effort to verify the identity of a new prospective
user and the uses certified by such prospective user prior to furnishing
131d. § 1681c.

'Where the information pertains to a suit or judgment, it may be included after 7 years if the
applicable statute of limitations has not run. Where criminal records are concerned, the 7 years is
measured from the date of disposition, release, or parole, as applicable. Id. § 1681c(a).
6MId. § 17811. An exception is made for information of public record.
6
1d. § 1681k.
1Id. § 1681e.

1972]

FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT

such user a consumer report. No consumer reporting agency may
furnish a consumer report to any person if it has reasonable grounds

for believing that the consumer report will not be used for a purpose
listed in section 604.
(b) Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer
report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possi-

ble accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom
the report relates.

The wording in subsection (b), "reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy," is very strong and should be construed to
require much more effort by the agency than if the wording had been
"to assure reasonable accuracy."
If credit reporting agencies make a bona fide effort to comply with
these standards, many of the subject's problems will be alleviated. However, where problems do arise, the FCRA has implicitly recognized that
many of them can be straightened out between the parties without resort
to the judicial process. Accordingly, the FCRA provides that certain
users must notify the subject of the use of credit reports and the credit
reporting agency must work with the subject to iron out any problems.
Except where the information is sought "for employment purposes
for which the [subject] has not specifically applied," no user may procure or cause to be prepared an investigative consumer report without
giving the subject notice that the report is being prepared."8 Further,
anytime a user of a credit report denies the subject credit, insurance, or
employment or increases the charge for credit or insurance either wholly
or partly because of information contained in the report, the user must
apprise the subject of that fact and identify the source of the credit
report. 9 With one minor exception, credit reporting agencies are not
required to give the subjects of the reports any notice that such reports
are being made.7"
Once the subject discovers, through the notice procedures or otherwise, that the reports are being made or that a file exists, he may
demand that the agency disclose to him the nature and substance of the
Ud.§ 1681d.
"Id. § 1681 m. Both sections that require users to give notice to the subjects of credit reports
provide that the user shall not be held liable for failure to give the required notice if he shows by

the preponderance of the evidence that he maintained reasonable procedures to assure compliance.
Id. §§ 1681d(c), 1681m(c).

7
Agencies are required to notify subjects that public record information is being reported for
employment purposes unless the agency checks the record the day it sends the report. Id. § 1681k.
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information in the file, the sources of the information (except sources
acquired and used only for preparing investigative reports), and a listing
of all persons to whom a report was furnished for employment purposes
in the preceding two years or was furnished for any other purpose in
the preceding six months. 71 The agency is required to provide a trained
person to explain the report to the subject. 71 It is at this level that many
misunderstandings may be worked out informally. To assist in this
process the subject has a right to be accompanied by one person of his
73
own choosing.
If the subject is not satisfied that any item in the report is accurate
or complete he-may so inform the agency, and it must reinvestigate the
item within a reasonable period unless it has reasonable grounds to
believe the dispute is frivolous or irrelevant. If the item is found to be
inaccurate or can no longer be verified, the agency must delete it and
must record the current status of any verified item.7 If this does not
resolve the dispute-as for example, where the source of the item insists
that the subject's account was once six months in arrears and the subject
flatly denies it-the subject may have included in his file and the agency
must include in future reports, a brief statement of his side of the
dispute. 75 When the subject's file is altered in this manner or by deletions
or corrections, the agency must inform the subject that he has the right
to have the amended report sent to any user whose identity the agency
is required to disclose.7 1 If the subject received notice of adverse action
based on the credit report, the agency must make the disclosures and
send any amended reports without charge. Otherwise the agency may
charge the subject a reasonable fee for disclosure of the file information
and also charge for the sending of a disputed report, but it may not
7
charge for sending reports, correcting, or deleting information. 7
The primary advantage of this fairly informal method of resolving
problems is that it offers the hope of clearing up the situation before
any substantial harm is done. Since the real value of the credit report
is in its reliability, it is probable that the agency will be nearly as
71

1d.
1d.
73
1d.
74
1d.
72

§
§
§
§

1681g.
1681h(c).
1681h(d).
1681 i(a).

71The agency may limit the subject's statement to 100 words if it assists him in writing it and
may clearly and accuratelycodify or summarize it for transmission purposes. Id. § 1681i(b), (c).
"Id. § 1681i(d).
-1d. § 1681j.
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interested as the subject in getting the matter straight. Where errors are
discovered and a new report is sent out, the user who once rejected the
subject in part because of the report may be under some pressure to
approve the transaction when the report is revised, thereby reducing the
harm or the subject's feeling of having been harmed.
To deal with those situations in which the informal procedure is
inadequate to prevent or remedy harm, the FCRA has two provisions
for civil actions by subjects against credit reporting agencies and the
users of credit reports." To enhance the usefulness of these actions
where the amount of damage is relatively low, though substantial,
the actions may be brought in a federal district court without regard
to the amount in controversy, 7 and, should the plaintiff succeed,
the defendant will be liable for costs and reasonable attorney's fees
as determined by the court."0 The actions differ only in that if the
plaintiff can establish a greater degree of misconduct, he can have
punitive damages."' Under the more basic of the two provisions,
"[a]ny consumer reporting agency or user of information which is
negligent in failing to comply with any requirement imposed" by
the FCRA shall be liable for any actual damages sustained by the
subject as a result of the failure. 2 The basis of liability is the negligent failure to meet the standards imposed. As previously stated,
one such standard is that the gredit reporting agency "shall follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the
information" in the credit report.8 3 It would thus seem that where an
injured subject was once required to show that the reporting agency's
conduct in preparing a report was malicious, or so reckless as to
amount to malice, he may now succeed by showing that the agency
was negligent in preparing a report that was inaccurate. For most jurisdictions this represents a substantial change. Defamation actions are
generally thwarted by the conditional privilege, which is not lost by mere
negligence in the preparation of a credit report,84 and the courts have
generally refused to entertain an action based on a negligent misstatement.85 Liability may also be found where the credit reporting agency
7

1ld. §§ 1681n, 1681o.
Wld. § 1681 p.
Oid. §§ 1681n(3), 1681o(2).
111d. § 1681n(2).
"21d. § 1681o.
'3Id.§ 1681e(b).
RAnnot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1049, § 3[b] (1971).
"Note, Liability for Misstatements by Credit-RatingAgencies, 43 VA. L. REv. 561, 563-67

(1957).
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negligently transmits obsolete information or negligently fails to assure
that reports are made to persons with proper purposes. In the latter case
it seems reasonably certain that the good faith reporting of an account
placed for collection ten years ago would be privileged in a defamation
action; under the FCRA, an agency that was negligent in not deleting
the information would be liable. The FCRA requirement that reports
be sent only to proper persons seems to be the least radical departure
from the normal rule; yet it appears to set a stricter than normal standard since it not only places an affirmative duty on the agency reasonably to assure that reports are sent only to proper persons for proper
purposes, but also flatly forbids furnishing a report where the agency
has reasonable grounds to believe the report will not be used for a proper
purpose."6
Saying that negligence is a sufficient basis for liability is one thing;
proving negligence is another. Although proving negligence should be
less difficult than proving malice or its equivalent and should put less
strain on courts that want the plaintiff to recover, there will still be
difficulties, if only because the requisite information is likely to be in
the sole possession of the defendant. Liberal discovery rules will alleviate the problem somewhat, and the fact that the defendant was in
exclusive control of the harmful mechanism may permit circumstantial
proof of negligence. For example, if the plaintiff is able to show that a
report sent out varies substantially from the information in the defendant's files, he should be deemed to have established a prima facie case
of negligence.
The liability imposed is for "actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure" to comply.87 Unfortunately, the statute
does not explain what it means by "actual damages" and there are only
two clues as to what is contemplated. First, the other civil action provision duplicates the "actual damages" language and also provides for the
awarding of punitive damages;88 thus it may fairly be assumed that
"actual damages" at most means all damages other than punitive damages. Secondly, it is provided that no action "in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy or negligence" may be brought based on information required to be disclosed under certain provisions of the statute
815 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) (1970). This provision may have the effect of preventing the agency
from weighing the evidence and making a judgment as to whether to send the report; it seems to

say, "If there is a weight on the negative side, you may not send it."
"Id. § 1681o(!).

SSd. § 1681n(2).
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except for those actions provided for in the statute. 9 A possible inference is that the actions provided for are in the nature of defamation,
invasion of privacy, or negligence and that the sorts of damages that
may be recovered in such actions may be recovered under the statute.
It is probably safe to surmise that some form of publication outside
the credit reporting agency is required to fail to comply with the standards considered thus far and that there can thus be no damage without
publication. 0 Where publication has resulted in a determination by the
user adverse to the subject, the subject will probably be able to recover
for the loss of the bargain involved and consequential damages, limited
by causation considerations. For example, the subject who is turned
down for automobile insurance and has to purchase it under an
assigned-risk plan should be able to recover the difference in premiums
and perhaps for the loss of the use of the automobile in the interim
period, if such insurance is compulsory. Beyond that he might also
recover for the embarrassment of being rejected and for the injury to
his reputation in the same manner as in a libel action. Where the publication has not resulted in adverse action, it would seem that the subject
would be limited to something very close to the recovery in a libel
action. To some extent this may raise the libel per se-libel per quod
controversy,"' and there is nothing to indicate where that might come
out. If the publication is to one not deemed a legitimate user, the action
would be more appropriately treated as though it were an invasion of
privacy by public disclosure of private facts with the "public" requirement waived.
The credit reporting agency defendant has clearly been stripped of
its conditional privilege and probably may not assert truth as an affirmative defense, although in many cases the plaintiff will probably have
to show falsity as an element of his cause of action. The agency may
try to raise contributory negligence or consent as defenses, but the tenor
A"1d. § 1681h(e).

"0Credit reporting agencies may also incur liability under the statute inter alia for failing to

comply with the requirements of discussing the subject's file with him or failing to include his
dissenting statement in a report. Id. §§ 1681g, 1681i, 1681n, & 1681o.
"1Byrd, Recent Developments in North Carolina Tort Law, 48 N.C.L. REv. 791, 798-99 &

n.34 (1970).
12Where it is alleged that the credit reporting agency has failed to comply by publishing

obsolete information or furnishing a report for an impermissible purpose, the truth of the information would have no bearing on liability. Where liability is predicated on the inaccuracy of the
report, it should be on the plaintiff to show that the statement was inaccurate, as it would be in an
action for misrepresentation. See Ginsberg v. Zagar, 126 Colo. 536, 251 P.2d 1080 (1952).
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of the statute is one of absolving the consumer from responsibilities,
which forebodes a cool reception for such defenses.
The other provision for civil actions is substantially the same except
that it provides that where the credit reporting agency or credit report
user willfully fails to comply with the statute the injured subject may
also recover punitive damages.13 Although "willfully" is not defined, it
is obviously a substitute for malice. Because of other language in the
FCRA it is fairly certain that "willfully" was not meant to require
malicious or evil motive. 4 "Willful" is given a wide variety of meanings
by various courts, but the federal courts dealing with it in federal statutes seem to have settled on a requirement of a conscious, voluntary,
and intentional decision to do the proscribed act.95 Thus, what is required by many courts to establish liability should be sufficient under
this provision for punitive as well as actual damages.
The FCRA works an interesting change in the law of defamation
as it applies to persons who supply information to credit reporting
agencies. For example, assume that a department store erroneously
reports to the credit agency that the subject's account has been placed
for collection. In a normal defamation action, the department store
could use the same sort of conditional privilege afforded the credit
reporting agency," and the subject would then have to show malice or,
in many jurisdictions, reckless or callous disregard of his interests in
order to recover.y Under the FCRA, if the subject had discovered the
erroneous report through any disclosure required by the statute, he
would be forbidden to bring any action in the nature of defamation,
invasion of privacy, or negligence against the reporting agency, any user
of the information, or any person who furnished the information to the
reporting agency except as provided in the civil action provisions of the
statute. 9 The civil action provisions of the statute are applicable only
'15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970).
9"FCRA § 610(e), 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970), limits consumers in certain situations to use

of either the provision for an action based on negligence or the provision for an action based on
willful noncompliance but withdraws the limit if there was "malice or willful intent to injure."
Therefore "willfully fails to comply" must be the less culpable standard. Compare 15
U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970), with 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (1970).
5
See, e.g., Hewitt v. United States, 377 F.2d 921, 924 (5th Cir. 1967); Dowd v. Blackstone
Clearners, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 1276, 1281 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
"See Putnal v. Inman, 76 Fla. 553, 80 So. 316 (1918); cf. Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131
Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915).
'7 Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 1049, § 3[a] (1971).
18l5 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
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to credit reporting agencies and users of the credit reports. 9 But for an
exception to the exclusive remedy provision, the source of the information would be immune. The exception is made "as to false information
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure" the subject. 0 The net
effect of this is that if the action is tainted by the disclosure provisions,
the defendant in a defamation action who was a source of information
may now claim what amounts to a statutory privilege. To overcome the
privilege the plaintiff will have to show that the information was
furnished with malice or willful intent to injure the plaintiff. In many
states this will be more difficult than showing an abuse of the traditional
conditional privilege. To the extent that the duties imposed by the statute do not completely cover acts for which the subject might bring an
action in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence,
the credit reporting agency might also find a small sanctuary. However,
it is not likely that a very meaningful sanctuary will be found if the
courts construe the statutory requirements in accordance with the specified purposes of the FCRA.
A subject of a report who discovers its existence by some method
other than the FCRA disclosure procedures has a choice of actions. He
may either proceed under the statute or bring any other action to which
he is entitled under state law. In most cases it will probably be more
advantageous to utilize the statute, if for no other reason than that
attorney's fees may be recovered.' 0' In those cases in which the duties
imposed by the statute are not closely enough related to the harm, the
subject will probably want to use a state cause of action. When he does
so, he obviously will run squarely into the old conditional privilege
problem.
It is arguable that the FCRA expresses such a strong national
policy with respect to credit reporting agencies that the basis for the
conditional privilege ought to be re-examined. The basic rationale of the
privilege has been that the public interest and advantages of publication
so outweigh the occasional damage caused to individuals that the damage should be allowed to go unremedied. 0 2 As the privilege has been
applied to credit reporting agencies, it has been questioned whether it
"Id.
1681n, 1681o.
'Id. § 1681h(e).
1'Id. §§ 1681n(3), 16810(2).
"2
IWatwood
v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 821 (1952).
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can be properly applied to a business for profit." 3 It seems quite clear
that credit and other risk-taking transactions make up an important
part of the economy and that if there were no credit reporting agencies,
so that the risk-takers had to make their own investigations, the denial
of the conditional privilege to the sources of information would substantially decrease the amount of information available. The result would
be a diminution in the number and magnitude of valued transactions.
In that situation the conditional privilege is probably necessary because
there would be no effective mechanism for spreading the risk of a large
judgment. This does not, however, present a convincing argument for
granting the privilege to credit reporting agencies unless one feels compelled to view such an agency as a simultaneous extension of both the
information source and the user. The agency is really a separate entity
capable of independently harming the subject of the credit report; it is
thus proper that the availability of the privilege to the agency be viewed
separately. In this context it is at once apparent that the credit reporting
agency is a mechanism capable of spreading the risk of a large judgment
by raising its fees in order to insure itself. If the statements of industry
spokesmen are accurate, the risk is really not very great, and where a
given agency performs so poorly that it is driven out of business with
lawsuits, society probably experiences a benefit rather than a detriment.
By implication the FCRA stands as a finding by Congress that a less
limited exposure of credit reporting agencies to liability is in the best
interest of society. Accordingly, it seems that the courts ought to assume
the posture of treating the credit agencies much like disseminators and
hold them liable for inaccurate transmission of information and liable
for the inaccuracies of the information where they reasonably should
have discovered the inaccuracy or where their dissemination is unreasonably improper. This would not affect the liability of the sources of
information and thus would not affect the availability of the information.
The FCRA will not please those primarily concerned with the privacy aspects of credit reporting, particularly those who believe that
credit information is a property belonging to the individual that he has
a right to control. The statute makes it fairly clear that the user of credit
reports has the right to demand credit information as a condition to
"0Smith, Conditional Privileges for Mercantile Agencies, Macintosh v. Dun (pts. 1-2), 14
COLUM. L. REV. 187, 296 (1914).
'See Note, Protecting the Subjects of Credit Reports, 80 YALE L.J. 1035, 1042-49 (1971).

